On October 18, 2004, the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs (the "Standing Committee") tabled in the Legislative Assembly of Ontario its "Report on the Five Year Review of the Securities Act." This report follows public hearings that the Standing Committee held in August 2004 as part of its review of the Five Year Review Committee Final Report: Reviewing the Securities Act, tabled in the Ontario legislature in May 2003. In this latter report, the Five Year Review Committee, chaired by Purdy Crawford, Q.C., made 95 recommendations dealing with many aspects of securities regulation in Ontario.
	The Standing Committee's unanimous report contains the following 14 recommendations.
1	The next review committee should be struck in May 2007. The committee should deliver an interim report by May 2008 and a final report by early 2009. Thereafter, a review committee should be appointed four years after the date of the establishment of the previous committee. This recommendation is in no way intended to discourage or preclude the Minister of Finance from initiating reviews of individual issues, as necessary.
2	The Standing Committee recognizes the critical need for a single securities regulator, and strongly recommends that the Ontario government continue to work with all stakeholders, including Ministers in other provinces, toward the development of a single securities regulator. The key elements of the new regulatory system should be one new regulator, one common body of securities law and one set of fees.
3	The government should introduce securities transfer legislation modelled on revised Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code in the United States.
4	The Standing Committee believes that the status quo is unacceptable, and recommends that the government initiate a review of the Legislature’s oversight of the Ontario Securities Commission. Any new oversight mechanism should include a requirement that the annual reports of the Commission be automatically referred to a Committee of the Legislature, and should ensure that the Committee has the ability to compel witnesses to appear before it, including the responsible minister, to answer questions regarding progress in implementing recommendations approved by the Legislature.
5	The adjudicative function of the Ontario Securities Commission should be separated from its other functions, based on the recommendations of the Fairness Committee.
6	The Ontario Securities Commission should not be given basket rulemaking authority.
7	The Ontario Securities Commission should not be given power to issue blanket rulings and orders; however, the Standing Committee recognizes that the Commission needs to be able to act in a timely manner and asks the government to study alternative mechanisms that would enhance efficiency, without sacrificing investor protection.
8	The government should closely monitor the implementation of Recommendation 28 of the Crawford Report (page 102), and should ask the Ontario Securities Commission to report on the progress in implementation in its annual report to the Legislature.
9	The government should establish a task force to review the role of SROs, including whether the trade association and regulatory functions of SROs should be separated.
10	The government should reintroduce the relevant provisions of the former Bill 41, and proclaim the civil liability provisions of Bill 198.
11	The Ontario Securities Commission should be given rulemaking authority over corporate governance matters generally, as recommended in Recommendation 61 of the Crawford Report (page 174).
12	The government should introduce legislation to amend the proxy solicitation rules in Ontario’s corporate and securities laws, as recommended in Recommendation 62 of the Crawford Report (page 180).
13	The Ontario Securities Commission and the CSA should require publicly offered mutual funds to establish and maintain an independent governance body that provides for substantial investor protection.
14	The Standing Committee recommends that the government work with the Ontario Securities Commission to establish a workable mechanism that would allow investors to pursue restitution in a timely and affordable manner and that the government report on its progress in this regard within 12 months. This work should take into account any measures to separate the adjudicative function of the Commission.
Separation of the OSC's adjudicative function from its other roles received support earlier this year from the "Osborne Committee."