Case Name:
R. v. Holmes
[1972] O.J. No. 1230
Also reported at:
25 C.R.(N.S.) 154
Ontario County Court
Graburn Co. Ct. J.
Oral judgment: June 7, 1972.
(54 paras.)
Counsel:
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C. Scullion, for the Crown.
R.J. Carter, for the accused. |
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¶ 1
GRABURN Co. Ct. J. (orally):— Mr. Holmes is charged as follows:
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"That on or about the 12th day of December
in the year 1967, being a witness in a judicial proceeding, to
wit: an investigation ordered by the Ontario Securities Commission
under section 21 subsection (1) of the Securities Act, 1966, of
Ontario, by order dated the 16th day of November, 1967, unlawfully
committed perjury by giving false evidence to the effect that he was
not aware of the account of the Sisters of St. Joseph, Parry Sound,
Ontario, with Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited, he was not aware of
the transactions between the Sisters of St. Joseph, Parry Sound,
Ontario, and Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited, and did not see the
ledger cards kept by Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited relating to
the account of the Sisters of St. Joseph, Parry Sound, Ontario,
knowing such evidence was false and with intent to mislead, contrary
to the Criminal Code." |
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¶ 2 Mr.
Holmes re-elected on this indictment to be tried in County Court Judges'
Criminal Court, and he has pleaded not guilty.
¶ 3 The
transcript of the evidence which is referred to in the count which I have
just read has been marked as an exhibit in this trial, as well as the
transcript of the evidence at a previous trial of the accused, to which I
shall refer at a later point in these reasons, and also the exhibits
marked at the previous trial were filed as exhibits at this trial.
¶ 4 From
the transcripts and from the exhibits certain facts clearly emerge.
¶ 5 The
accused, a chartered accountant, was the auditor for Meggeson, Goss and
Company Limited, a firm of investment dealers. Prior to 1967, Meggeson,
Goss and Company Limited had been placed in bankruptcy and had been
suspended by the Ontario Securities Commission. Meggeson, Goss and Company
Limited had amongst their clients the Sisters of St. Joseph, in Parry
Sound, who had advanced a considerable amount of money to Meggeson, Goss
and Company Limited in order that the company would purchase for the Order
short term separate school bonds with a high interest rate. These bonds
were purchased by Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited, but were
subsequently pledged to the bank to secure personal loans to the
principals of the company. Such a pledge constituted a theft of the bonds
by Meggeson and Goss, and the consequent debt to the Sisters of St. Joseph
constituted a liability on the part of the limited company.
¶ 6 In
1966 and 1967 the accused prepared financial statements or balance sheets
as Meggeson and Goss Limited's auditor. These statements purported to
refer to the company's affairs for the years ending 31st December 1965 and
31st December 1966, respectively. In each year two statements were
prepared by the accused. One statement was for the information of the
company's shareholders and was additionally furnished for income tax
purposes. A second statement was for the information of the
Investment Dealers' Association, of
which Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited was a member. The
Investment Dealers' Association is a
body recognized by the Ontario Securities Commission, and through which
members exercise self-imposed "policing" powers over one another. Not all
investment dealers are members of the
Investment Dealers' Association, but supervisory regulations exist
for all investment dealers, whether or not they belong to the
Investment Dealers' Association. If they
do not belong, regulatory supervision emanates directly from the Ontario
Securities Commission. For all practical purposes the scope of the
authority is identical, whether it is exercised by the
Investment Dealers' Association or the
Ontario Securities Commission.
¶ 7 In
1966 the two statements prepared by Mr. Holmes showed substantially
different financial positions for the company. The same divergence was
revealed in the two statements he prepared in 1967.
¶ 8 Mr.
Holmes's working papers, on which the statements prepared in 1966 and 1967
were based, contain no reference to the account of the Sisters of St.
Joseph. The bonds stolen from the Sisters by Meggeson and Goss were listed
by the accused as being the property of Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited
in the relevant financial statements.
¶ 9
Following the limited company's bankruptcy and suspension, Mr. Holmes was
examined by the Ontario Securities Commission, as is set out in the charge
before the Court. And the Crown alleges that he committed perjury in
respect of three specific items of evidence, reference to which will be
made in the course of these reasons.
¶ 10 In
1968 Mr. Holmes was indicted on seven counts, one of which was the perjury
count presently before this Court. The accused appeared for trial on these
seven counts before Waisberg Co. Ct. J. and a jury, in May 1971. The
additional six counts were as follows:
¶ 11
Count 1 charged him that in the years 1964 to 1967 inclusive, at Toronto,
he stole a number of valuable securities having a value of $90,500 more or
less, the property of the Sisters of St. Joseph, Parry Sound, Ontario,
contrary to the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
¶ 12 On
Count 2 he was charged that, at Toronto, in 1966, he unlawfully made a
false document, to wit, a balance sheet relating to the financial position
of Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited as at 31st December 1965, knowing it
to be false, with intent that some person should be induced by the belief
that it was genuine, to refrain from scrutinizing the affairs of Meggeson,
Goss and Company Limited, and thereby committed forgery, contrary to the
Criminal Code.
¶ 13 On
Count 3 he was charged that, at Toronto, in 1967, he unlawfully made a
false document, to wit, a balance sheet relating to the financial position
of Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited as at 31st December 1966, knowing it
to be false, with intent that some person should be induced by the belief
that it was genuine, to refrain from scrutinizing the affairs of Meggeson,
Goss and Company Limited, and thereby committed forgery, contrary to the
Criminal Code.
¶ 14 On
Count 4 he was charged that, at Toronto, in 1966, knowing that a document,
to wit, a balance sheet, relating to the financial position of Meggeson,
Goss and Company Limited, as at 31st December 1965 was forged, unlawfully
used it as if it were genuine, contrary to the Criminal Code.
¶ 15 On
Count 5 he was charged that, at Toronto, in 1967, knowing that a document,
to wit, a balance sheet, relating to the financial position of Meggeson,
Goss and Company Limited, as at 31st December 1966 was forged, unlawfully
used it as if it were genuine, contrary to the Criminal Code.
¶ 16
Count 6 is the count presently before this Court.
¶ 17 On
Count 7 he was charged that, at Toronto, during the years 1964 to 1967
inclusive, knowing that Harry Barton Goss, John Robert Meggeson and
Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited had been parties to the theft of a
number of valuable securities having a value of $90,500, more or less, the
property of the Sisters of St. Joseph, Parry Sound, Ontario, assisted them
for the purpose of enabling them to escape by preparing false financial
statements which indicated that such valuable securities were the property
of Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited and was thereby an accessory after
the fact to the commission of the indictable offence of theft, contrary to
the Criminal Code.
¶ 18
Counts 2 and 4 related to the alleged forgery and uttering of the
financial statements in 1965 prepared for the
Investment Dealers' Association.
¶ 19
Counts 3 and 5 related to the alleged forgery and uttering respectively of
the financial statements for 1966, and they were the subject of a directed
verdict of not guilty. The transcript clearly indicates that the Crown
completely abandoned those counts at the trial thereof.
¶ 20 At
the outset of this trial - and I refer to the trial before Waisberg Co.
Ct. J. - upon an application made by the accused, the learned trial Judge
directed that the perjury count be severed from the remaining six counts,
and he directed the remaining six counts be proceeded with. Following his
not guilty plea Mr. Holmes gave evidence in defence at that trial. On 26th
May 1971 he was acquitted on each of the six counts before the jury.
¶ 21 In
the present trial, arising out of his not guilty plea, Mr. Holmes raised
the defence of res judicata.
¶ 22 Mr.
Scullion, who has appeared on behalf of the Crown in the trial of the
perjury charge before this Court, submits that the count of perjury having
been severed at the trial in May 1971, res judicata is not available here
to the accused. Mr. Scullion contends that this trial is simply a
continuation of the previous trial, and that this is, in substance, a
concurrent proceeding to the trial of May 1971. He relies upon the case of
Regina v. Peda, [1969] 1 O.R. 90, 4 C.R.N.S. 161, [1969] 2 C.C.C. 228
(C.A.), affirmed [1969] S.C.R. 905, 7 C.R.N.S. 243, [1969] 4 C.C.C. 245, 6
D.L.R. (3d) 177.
¶ 23 In
that case the accused was acquitted of impaired driving, and he was
convicted of dangerous driving by a jury where both counts had been tried
together. On appeal by the accused from his conviction, he submitted that
issue estoppel or res judicata applied against the Crown in connection
with the dangerous driving charge. The accused's appeal was dismissed.
¶ 24 At
p. 236 of the report [C.C.C.], McLennan J.A. said:
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"Ground (3) raises the question of issue
estoppel - that is to say, that the appellant having been acquitted on
the impaired driving charge should not be placed in jeopardy in the
dangerous driving charge which arose out of the same facts." |
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¶ 25
After referring to the well-known cases of Connelly [Connelly v. Director
of Public Prosecutions, [1964] A.C. 1254, 48 Cr. App. R. 183, [1964] 2 All
E.R. 401] and Wright [Regina v. Wright, [1965] 2 O.R. 337, 45 C.R. 38,
[1965] 3 C.C.C. 160, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 498 (C.A.)], his Lordship continued:
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"It is abundantly clear from these
authorities that the defence only applies where there has been a
determination of the issue against the Crown in a previous trial. It
has never been applied to concurrent charges dealt with at one trial." |
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¶ 26
There is no suggestion in the Peda case that where, as here, the accused
obtains an order for severance of a count in a multiple count indictment,
which s. 520(3) of the Criminal Code authorizes, he is thereby precluded
from raising issue estoppel in a subsequent trial of the severed count. In
my judgment in such a case if he were convicted on the severed count, and
the conviction was wholly inconsistent with the verdicts on the counts
from which severance was made, he would have an unanswerable ground of
appeal. He would likewise in my view have an unanswerable ground of appeal
if the conviction was inconsistent with the prior verdicts by reason of
facts having been determined conclusively in his favour in the prior
trial.
¶ 27 If
issue estoppel is available to an accused in these circumstances on
appeal, it defies logic, in my view, to eliminate a defence so based at
the trial of the severed count.
¶ 28
Furthermore, as I indicated in argument, if in a multiple count
indictment, the Crown, as is its perfect right, chose to proceed on one
count only and a verdict was returned on that count, and then the Crown
proceeded on another count in the indictment, then, if the argument of
Crown counsel before me, namely that such proceedings are concurrent in
principle, is correct, the defence of res judicata would not be available
to the accused on the second trial based upon the disposition of the first
trial.
¶ 29 Now,
while it is true that the Court in Regina v. Feeley, McDermott and Wright,
[1963] 1 O.R. 571, 38 C.R. 321, [1963] 1 C.C.C. 254, 38 D.L.R. (2d) 133
(C.A.), affirmed [1963] S.C.R. 539, 40 C.R. 261, [1963] 3 C.C.C. 201, 40
D.L.R. (2d) 563, held in similar circumstances that from a factual
standpoint the defence failed , it is clear from that judgment that the
defence, if supported in the factual context, would avail to an accused.
¶ 30
Accordingly I am satisfied that if the accused can satisfy the burden
placed upon him by the authorities to which I will refer momentarily, the
defence of res judicata is open to him notwithstanding that the count
before this Court was severed from the other counts in the indictment in
May 1971.
¶ 31 At
the prior trial the Court also ordered particulars to be given to the
accused in relation to the counts then before the Court.
¶ 32 Mr.
Carter submits, and I entirely agree with this submission, that it is
essential to consider the particulars so furnished pursuant to the order
of the Court in order to appreciate the issues before the jury at that
trial. In view of the circumstances pertaining to the directed verdicts on
Counts 3 and 5 it is necessary to consider the particulars as they
affected Counts 1, 2, 4 and 7 of the indictment only.
¶ 33 I
have read pp. 3 to 7 inclusive of Ex. A marked at this trial, and it is
perfectly apparent that the particulars of the falsity of the financial
statements submitted to the Investment Dealers'
Association by the accused as audited for Meggeson, Goss and
Company Limited for the year ending 1965 related to two distinct matters.
First, that the statement was false in that it omitted the account of the
Sisters of St. Joseph, Parry Sound, Ontario. Second, that the financial
statement prepared by the accused as auditor for Meggeson, Goss and
Company Limited for the year ending 1965 for tax and shareholders'
information is evidence of the falsity of the statement furnished for the
Investment Dealers' Association in that
it differed substantially from it and both purported to reflect the
financial condition of Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited for the same
year.
¶ 34 Mr.
Carter contends that in the light of the particulars furnished by the
Crown, the jury must have been satisfied or had a reasonable doubt in
order to acquit the accused on each of the counts, that neither aspect of
the falsity had been brought home to the accused so far as the
Investment Dealers' Association
financial statement is concerned, that is, they must have accepted or have
been left in doubt in respect of the accused's explanation at the trial
regarding the difference in the two statements for 1965 and - and I
underscore the word "and" - they must have accepted or have been left in
doubt on the evidence as a whole, that he was unaware of the account of
the Sisters of St. Joseph, Parry Sound, with Meggeson, Goss and Company
Limited. In view of the particulars which were furnished by the Crown I
agree that it was necessary for the jury to find both of these matters in
Mr. Holmes's favour before they could acquit on any of the Counts 2, 4 and
7, and it would be insufficient for an acquittal to find one element only
in his favour.
¶ 35 In
the case of Feely, McDermott and Wright, supra, a judgment of the Ontario
Court of Appeal, Schroeder J.A. said, at pp. 266-7 [C.C.C.] that:
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"It must be recognized that there may be
cases in criminal law to which the pleas of autrefois convict and
autrefois acquit do not extend because of the lack of identity between
the offences charged in an earlier and later indictment but to which
the common-law defence of res judicata, preserved by the provisions of
s. 7(2) of the Criminal Code, may in some circumstances be
applicable." |
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¶ 36 His
Lordship then referred to the case of Rex v. Quinn (1905), 11 O.L.R. 242,
10 C.C.C. 412 (C.A.), and after referring to the cases, his Lordship
indicated:
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"Where that defence is raised the onus is
cast upon the accused to establish all the facts necessary to support
it and to satisfy the Court that in the earlier proceedings there was
a determination of a question of fact vital to the later charge which
operates as an estoppel against the Crown so as to bar the later
prosecution. In criminal cases where the accusations are not the same
in substance or where the essential ingredients may be widely
different, as here, that onus may be a very burdensome one." |
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¶ 37 I
have read the evidence given at the trial in May 1971 in its entirety, and
the addresses of counsel, both for the Crown and for the defence, and I
have also read the charge of the learned trial Judge to the jury. In
considering the particulars given at the opening of that trial I have come
to the conclusion that the accused before me has discharged the onus cast
upon him to establish all the facts necessary to support the defence of
res judicata. I am satisfied that in the earlier proceedings there was a
dual factual determination, one of which is vital to the present charge,
and that such factual determination operates as an estoppel against the
Crown so as to bar this prosecution.
¶ 38 The
principles underlying issue estoppel are clear, but the application of the
principles to the facts and circumstances of a given case can involve
complex difficulties. Now this, I think, is borne out by the case of
Feeley, McDermott and Wright, to which I have already made reference. In
that case, the appellants, so far as is relevant, were charged as follows:
¶ 39 In
the first count they were charged that: "between the 1st day of January,
1960, and the 1st day of July, 1960, in the Province of Ontario (they) did
unlawfully agree and conspire together to commit an indictable offence
under Section 101(b) of the Criminal Code of Canada by corruptly giving
money to George Scott, a peace officer of the Ontario Provincial Police
Force, with intent that the said George Scott should interfere with the
administration of justice, contrary to the Criminal Code of Canada,
Section 408(1)(d)."
¶ 40 And
in Count 2 they were further charged that: "between the first day of
January, 1960 and the first day of July, 1960, in the Province of Ontario,
did unlawfully agree and conspire together to effect an unlawful purpose,
to wit: to obtain from George Scott, a constable of the Ontario Provincial
Police, information which it was his duty not to divulge, contrary to the
Criminal Code of Canada, Section 408(2)."
¶ 41 Now,
at the first trial, proceeding on Count 1, the three accused were
acquitted. The Crown then proceeded against them on Count 2, and on that
count they were convicted. And at p. 266 of the report in the C.C.C.,
Schroeder J.A. said that:
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"The better view today is that the special
pleas of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit do not exhaust the
application ... of the principle of res judicata. This more general
ground of defence cannot be raised by a special plea but can be raised
under the plea of not guilty ..." |
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¶ 42 Now
the defence failed in that case because of a lack of the identity of
issues. And his Lordship continued. In discussing the question of res
judicata and the acquittal on Count 1, he went on to say, and again I am
quoting, and this is from p. 268 of the C.C.C.:
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"No one can say what was the precise ratio
decidendi of the jury ... To plead successfully the defence of res
judicata the appellants must establish that a point of fact vital to
the second charge was determined against the Crown and that,
accordingly, further prosecution of the appellants on count 2 is
barred." |
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¶ 43 In
the case of McDonald v. The Queen, [1960] S.C.R. 186, 32 C.R. 101, 126
C.C.C. 1, the accused had been acquitted by a jury on a charge of
conspiring to be in possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking,
and subsequently he was convicted of being in possession of the same drugs
for the purpose of trafficking. One of the grounds of appeal from his
conviction was that the issue was res judicata. The appeal was dismissed.
Martland J. said at p. 18:
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"As I see it, the principle of res judicata
enunciated in the Sambasivam case [Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor,
Federation of Malaya, [1950] A.C. 458] only estops the Crown in the
later legal proceedings from questioning that which was in substance
the ratio of and fundamental to the decision in the earlier
proceedings." |
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¶ 44 In
the present case the perjury alleged in the count before this Court is
three-fold. (1) That the accused falsely swore that he was not aware of
the account of the Sisters of St. Joseph, Parry Sound, Ontario, with
Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited. (2) That he falsely swore that he was
not aware of the transactions between the Sisters of St. Joseph, Parry
Sound, Ontario, and Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited. And (3) he falsely
swore that he did not see the ledger cards kept by Meggeson, Goss and
Company Limited relating to the account of the Sisters of St. Joseph,
Parry Sound, Ontario.
¶ 45 Now,
although three distinct aspects of Mr. Holmes's evidence before the
Ontario Securities Commission are alleged to be perjured, it is clear in
the circumstances of this case that they resolve themselves into one
allegedly false statement, namely, that he was unaware of the actual
account of and transactions by the Sisters of St. Joseph with Meggeson,
Goss and Company Limited, as he had not seen the genuine ledger card
relating to their account.
¶ 46 At
the trial, Mr. Holmes gave substantially the same evidence as he did
before the Ontario Securities Commission. He admitted making two financial
statements in each of the years 1966 and 1967, and he testified that his
working papers on which the financial statements were based did not
reflect any transactions involving the Sisters of St. Joseph as he knew of
none. The only ledger sheet he had seen, according to his testimony,
pertaining to the Sisters was a ledger showing a "nil" balance. There was
abundant evidence at the trial that this dummy ledger card was used in
particular to deceive the accused in connection with the company's
involvement with the Sisters. As I said before the accused gave an
explanation at the trial as to the differences between the two financial
statements prepared in 1966 for the year ended 31st December 1965.
¶ 47 The
issues which the Crown seeks to litigate before me were at the very core
of the Crown's case at the previous trial. Mr. Holmes could only have been
guilty of theft of the bonds as charged in Count 1 if he aided and abetted
Meggeson and Goss in the theft thereof, and Count 7 was complimentary to
Count 1 in that regard, as it charged him with being an accessory after
the fact to the theft. Now, in support of the contention that Holmes was a
party to the theft, the Crown's case was that he concealed the theft by
the preparation and uttering of a false financial statement relating to
Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited to the
Investment Dealers' Association in 1966, omitting the Sisters'
account. On any fair view of the evidence and the verdicts returned, the
jury found that he did not knowingly omit their account.
¶ 48 In
support of the contention of Mr. Holmes as an accessory after the fact of
the theft, the Crown pleaded that he concealed the theft by the
preparation and uttering of false financial statements relating to
Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited for the years 1964 to 1967 by
attributing ownership of the bonds to the company. Again, on a fair view
of the evidence he could only have knowledge of such falsity if he were
aware of the true state of the Sisters' account and I am satisfied that
the jury's verdict negatives this knowledge.
¶ 49 And
finally, as I have stated before, Mr. Holmes could only have been guilty
on the forgery and uttering count if he knew of the true state of the
Sisters' account or, not and, but or, he had deliberately falsified the
financial statement prepared for the Investment
Dealers' Association, regard being had to the financial statement
prepared for tax and shareholders' purposes. The jury by their verdict of
not guilty have clearly determined both of these issues in Mr. Holmes's
favour.
¶ 50
Accordingly, in my judgment, the sole issue in this trial, namely, whether
Holmes lied before the Ontario Securities Commission by stating on oath
that he was unaware of the actual account of and transactions by the
Sisters of St. Joseph, Parry Sound, Ontario, with Meggeson, Goss and
Company Limited, as he had not seen the genuine ledger card relating to
their account, has been conclusively determined in the accused's favour at
the previous trial.
¶ 51 It
was argued by Mr. Scullion at this trial, a reasonable interpretation of
the jury's verdict in the previous trial was that while the jury might
have been satisfied that the accused was aware of the true state of the
account of the Sisters of St. Joseph, Parry Sound, with Meggeson, Goss and
Company Limited, they may have had a reasonable doubt as to his criminal
intent.
¶ 52 Upon
a reading of all of the evidence in the previous trial, the addresses of
counsel and the Judge's charge to the jury, it is abundantly clear that
the intent which was attributed to the accused by the Crown was that
specified in Count 2 of the indictment, namely, that he had made a false
financial statement intending that the
Investment Dealers' Association would refrain from scrutinizing the
affairs of Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited. Now, as Mr. Carter has
submitted, this question was never an issue before the jury.
Realistically, there was no suggestion at the previous trial that had the
accused prepared the false financial statement, nevertheless he did not
have the requisite intent set out in the indictment. In my judgment the
issue at that trial was clear and it was crystal clear. Did the accused
knowingly prepare a false balance sheet? If he did, in all the
circumstances of the case, the only possible conclusion a jury could reach
was that his intent was to induce the
Investment Dealers' Association from scrutinizing the affairs of
Meggeson, Goss and Company Limited.
¶ 53 Now
the jury, in my view, by their verdict have found conclusively in Mr.
Holmes's favour the very issue that the Crown alleges against him in the
present trial.
¶ 54 So,
Mr. Holmes, for the reasons that I have just given, I am finding you not
guilty. You are free to go
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